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About us: 
The Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment (VCC) is a leading applied 
research center and forum for the study, practice and discussion of sustainable international 
investment. The VCC focuses on analyzing important topical policy-oriented issues and constructing 
and implementing an investment framework that promotes sustainable development and the 
mutual trust needed for long-term investments that can be practically adopted by governments, 
companies and civil society. The Center undertakes its mission through interdisciplinary research, 
advisory projects, multi-stakeholder dialogue, educational programs, and the development of 
resources and tools. The VCC regularly collaborates with other Earth Institute and Columbia Law 
School centers and faculty, as well as institutions worldwide, integrating our expertise in law, 
economics and investment with diverse fields of sustainable development. www.vcc.columbia.edu 
 
The HUMBOLDT-VIADRINA School of Governance in Berlin was founded in 2009 by the Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin and the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder) to bring together the 
public and private sectors, civil society, academia, and the media. Its aim is to find practical solutions 
for social challenges and to contribute to sustainable democratic politics by building political 
consensus through multi-stakeholder cooperation. The School has a special character: it seeks to be 
an academically respected institution, as well as an active civil society organization that encourages 
public debates and long-term policy projects. www.humboldt-viadrina.org 
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Support for Developing Country Governments 





From time to time, all countries need to negotiate complex contracts with major private investors, 
suppliers and contractors. The most important and complex are often investment contracts related 
to natural resource and infrastructure projects. These investments can last for many decades and 
involve issues relating to sharing of economic rent between the investor and host government as 
well as significant environmental and social impacts. These contracts are, for many countries, an 
important means of generating funds to drive economic growth, development and prosperity. 
However, despite their critical importance, many developing country governments negotiate 
contracts that fail to maximize the benefits for their country.  
The issue of support for developing country governments in complex contract negotiations was 
discussed at a workshop held in Berlin in October 2011, organized by the Humboldt-Viadrina School 
of Governance and the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment. The 2011 
workshop brought together a number of important actors involved in or with knowledge of 
developing country negotiations, including government officials, representatives of major investors, 
lawyers involved in contract negotiations, representatives of existing initiatives providing 
negotiation support, members of civil society and academics. There was consensus among 
participants at that workshop about the need for an expansion of support for developing countries 
in their contract negotiations, and that such support should include the involvement of lawyers, 
financial and fiscal analysts, environment/climate experts, geologists/mining experts, business 
strategists, and political risk experts.  
A follow-up workshop is taking place on July 18 and 19, 2012, in New York. The purpose of this 
follow-up workshop is to assess the need and demand for negotiation assistance; to undertake a gap 
                                                            
*
 This paper was prepared jointly by the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment (VCC) 
and the Humboldt-Viadrina School of Governance (HVSG). The report was authored by James Bond 
(coordinator), Jacky Mandelbaum, and Antje Kunst, with help from Kari Lipschutz.  Research was primarily 
carried out by Jacky Mandelbaum of VCC and Antje Kunst of HVSG. The paper was overseen by a Steering 
Committee composed of Joe Bell, Sven Biermann, James Bond, Natty Davis, Peter Eigen, Paul Jourdan, Antje 
Kunst, Jacky Mandelbaum, Barry Metzger, Akere Muna, Lisa Sachs, Karl P. Sauvant, Christopher Sheldon, 
Perrine Toledano, and Lou Wells.  
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analysis between such demand and existing sources of support and to assess a number of innovative 
alternative approaches (both existing and proposed). Based on these analyses, the participants at 
the workshop will explore, at a preliminary level, whether and if so what type of potential 
mechanisms, tools and innovative solutions can usefully be provided to make comprehensive 
support available to enable developing country governments to secure the best possible deals.  
This background paper has been prepared for the follow-up workshop. It spells out, for the purpose 
of guiding discussions rather than as an exhaustive list, the nature and scope of developing 
countries’ needs for support (Section I); the existing sources of support (Section II); the missing 
elements and challenges to address to fully meet these needs (Section III); and some possible 
options for delivering additional support (Section IV). While commercial contracts are often fraught 
with complexities for both the private contracting party and the government, the research 
underlying this paper focused mainly on contracts relating to investment projects. 
Methodology 
The material for this background paper was obtained based on the outcomes of the Berlin workshop 
(attended by 36 participants, representing home and host countries, multilateral and bilateral 
organizations, civil society, the private sector and academia), desk research and over 30 targeted 
telephone interviews with key stakeholders with experience in complex negotiations in Africa, Asia, 
Latin America, Europe, Australia and North America. Stakeholders included officials from developing 
country governments, representatives of the initiatives described in Section II, and other experts 





I. DEVELOPING COUNTRY NEEDS FOR NEGOTIATION SUPPORT 
This section will review the needs of developing countries for support in their contract negotiations 
and identify the types of support needed.   
A. Reasons for sub-optimal contracts 
Developing country governments face a number of challenges in negotiating complex deals across a 
range of sectors. It is important to understand these challenges and the exact problems faced in 
order to design appropriate solutions.  
The chief cause of poorly negotiated deals is generally resource constraints – limited financial, 
technical and human resources - on the part of developing country governments. Government 
officials may lack specialized know-how, technical expertise and experience in negotiating complex 
contracts. This is compounded by problems of high staff turnover in key agencies and difficulties 
attracting or retaining qualified and experienced staff due to salary differentials vis-à-vis the private 
sector.
1
 As a result government negotiators may have limited or no experience with negotiating 
similar deals and a limited understanding of the fiscal and other options available to them.  
Other causes of poorly negotiated deals may include:  
• asymmetry of information with respect to economic variables of the transaction and 
relevant fiscal and legal tools;  
• time pressure from external donors and companies to conclude negotiations;  
• weak governance;  
• the desire, for political purposes, to manage transactions independently rather than seek 
external support;  
• poor and incoherent legal and regulatory frameworks, e.g., lack of coherence in fiscal 
legislation such as mutually inconsistent tax laws;  
• internal competition among different ministries to influence the outcome of the negotiation 
process2; and  
• corruption on the part of government officials in charge of negotiating contracts - the 
secretive nature of many deals and the lack of transparency and public scrutiny provide 
opportunities for abuse and corruption.
3
  
Large companies, on the other hand, will generally have superior means to carry out their side of the 
negotiation, both in terms of in-house resources and the ability to engage external firms as 
necessary. Companies also generally have a more coherent negotiation strategy and end goals. They 
may use loopholes in the legal and regulatory frameworks and information asymmetries to their 
short-term advantage, but at the cost of a less robust contractual relationship overall.4 
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B. Impacts of sub-optimal contracts 
Poorly conceived and negotiated contracts not only prevent a country from enjoying the full long 
term benefits of its resources, but can entrench poverty, corruption and even conflicts, particularly 
when governance systems are inadequate.  The impacts of sub-optimal investment contracts are far-
reaching, especially if their duration extends over several decades, including: substantial loss of 
public revenue; natural resource degradation and depletion; loss of access to resources for local 
communities; and the non-achievement of larger development goals of a country (e.g. poverty 
reduction).
5
 Negative impacts may also include the temporary or permanent displacement of people 
without proper consultation and compensation and environmental damage or disturbance that can 
adversely impact food supply, water supplies, and livelihoods.6 
It is highly likely that host countries will seek to renegotiate the terms of poor or unfavorable 
contracts, either because the conditions existing at the time the original terms are agreed have 
changed (as it is almost inevitable that these long-term deals will undergo “fundamental changes” at 
least once in the course of their existence7) and/or because it becomes clear to the host country 
government with time that the terms of the contract were not sufficiently beneficial (often after an 
outcry from host communities or civil society). Indeed, evidence points to a significantly greater 
frequency of renegotiations in cases where the initial contracts are unbalanced, poorly drafted, or 
inflexible to changing economic circumstances.
8
 In this respect, the number of renegotiations that 
have taken place with regard to infrastructure projects has been particularly high.
9
 Renegotiations 
are costly for host country governments. Even where the reason for renegotiating is an attempt to 
redress what was a manifestly inequitable deal, the host country’s reputation vis-à-vis investors will 
likely be tarnished as a result and it will have lost potential benefits over the initial period of the 
contract. Further, host country initiated renegotiations may trigger international arbitration which 
can be extremely costly for governments, not only in terms of the size of the potential awards but 
also in legal fees and reputational damage, regardless of the outcome of the case. Indeed, the 
number of international investment or commercial arbitration disputes before arbitration tribunals 
has increased substantially in recent years.
10
  
It is therefore important for developing country governments to be in a position to negotiate strong 
deals at the outset, maximizing the impact of the investment for the benefit of the country as well 
as, if possible, providing flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances without the need to invoke 
contested renegotiations. Creating a strong deal at the outset, from the perspective of both the 
investor and the host country, may minimize the risk that the deal is revisited. 
C. Types of contracts 
Complex contracts can include natural resource contracts (e.g. mining, oil and gas, forestry 
concessions, commercial fishing rights, agriculture concessions), infrastructure contracts 
(construction, operation and/or management of large infrastructure) and other investment and 
commercial contracts (e.g., textile plants that import raw cotton and export textiles, or aluminum 
smelters that import bauxite and export aluminum). These contracts define the terms of an 
investment project, allocate risks between contracting parties, and determine profit sharing, as well 
as the scope of the costs and benefits for each party. In countries with weak legal systems, contracts 
can be very detailed, dealing with a broad range of issues in order to compensate for inadequate 
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and outdated legislative and regulatory frameworks. They can also constitute the key instrument for 
the governance of the investment over its lifetime. Complex contracts, within this wide landscape, 
vary widely in their structure, level of detail, linkages to existing legislation and economic 
parameters.  
Contracting norms differ substantially across a range of regions, sectors and contracts.  The process 
by which the government and private contracting party arrive at an agreement varies - by sector, by 
nature of the investment, and according to whether it is competitive or first-come first-served. 
Accordingly, the type of support required will differ from contract to contract. There may be 
significant differences in the potential source of funds for engaging assistance for various types of 
contracts; for example, with respect to infrastructure agreements, the presence of third party 
financing can provide an immediate source of funds which brings the possibility of paying counsel, 
with the cost of the government’s legal counsel being wrapped into the project sponsor’s costs 
(which are ultimately covered, in a certain proportion, by a financing entity). The presence of the 
financing entity creates certain restraints, some beneficial and some not so beneficial. Although 
third party financing may be involved in the case of natural resource concessions, it is not common 
at the stage of closing the deal and there are no contractual guarantees of cost recovery. 
D. Different phases in preparing and negotiating contracts 
A number of different steps are involved in preparing and negotiating an investment contract. As is 
evident from the discussion above, these vary from country to country, sector to sector, and in some 
cases investment to investment. Each of these steps may involve a wide range of skills, requiring 
different types of assistance. A description of the goals of each step and the types of support needed 
is elaborated in Annex I. Some of these skills are listed in Section I.E below.  
For the purposes of this paper, these steps have been divided as follows: 
Setting the Investment Environment: 
(Non project-specific) 
• Formulating government policies and strategies 
• Reforming legislative and regulatory frameworks 




• Conducting/reviewing project feasibility and other studies 
• Conducting/reviewing environmental and social impact assessments 
• Preparing tender documents (where the contract is granted through a competitive process) 
• Preparing model contracts 
• Managing the tendering process 
• Preparing financial structure 
 
Negotiation phase: 
• Assembling a multi-disciplinary negotiation team 
• Preparing the negotiation position 
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• Developing negotiation strategy 
• Negotiating the contract 
• Drafting and reviewing contractual provisions 
 
Contract implementation phase: 
• Monitoring to ensure contract compliance 
E. Skills and the nature of external support  
The range of skills sets needed to successfully conclude a complex negotiation includes, inter alia, 
the following: 
• Project development 
• Sector and project economics 
• Legal (both sector-specific and broader financial, fiscal, commercial) 
• Financial analysis and modeling 
• Financial structuring  
• Sector-specific expertise (e.g. geology, infrastructure, industry)  
• Environment, social impacts and human rights 
• Occupational health and work safety  
• Governance (e.g. anti-corruption/stakeholder engagement) 
• Fiscal and tax management 
• Tendering and procurement 
• Accounting and financial reporting 
• Negotiation strategy 
Some of these skills may be available within the administration, e.g. fiscal and tax management, 
tendering and procurement etc., while others may not.  
Where skills are not available internally, the government can choose between acquisition and 
retention through capacity building, or to outsource as technical assistance. Retaining scarce skills 
within the administration has proven to be difficult in many countries including industrialized ones, 
either because of rapid skills obsolescence or through staff turnover as trained civil servants move to 
other departments or leave for the more attractive salaries in the private sector. In some cases, 
specialized government bodies have been created (e.g. the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate) which 
are able to pay private sector salaries outside the civil service pay scales, to favor retention. 
Moreover, an important question that governments need to consider is whether it is more effective 
to develop skills in-house, or to outsource them to some extent on the basis that these large scale, 
complex negotiations do not take place frequently so it may not be realistic or efficient to try to 
develop the skills in-house in every ministry that may need to negotiate such contracts. 
• Capacity building is often a long-term, continuing process, building sustainable technical 
capacity and other skills of government officials to do the job themselves. Capacity 
building also involves the development of skills of government officials to identify needs 
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for external technical experts, procure their services (including conducting the 
consultant selection process), contract and manage outside experts, and monitor 
outcomes of their services. 
• Technical Assistance involves in most cases the short term contracting of experts with 
relevant skills/knowledge to assist with specific functions in lieu of government officials. 
F. Willingness of governments to seek support 
The telephone interviews with government officials, advisers and international experts gauged the 
willingness of governments to accept external negotiation advice. These interviews revealed general 
willingness when such advice is really needed, e.g. for activities such as the preparation of feasibility 
studies during the period leading up to negotiations, to provide expert advice during the 
negotiations themselves, and to assist with drafting the contract. A reluctance to leave the 
monitoring of the contract to external advisers was observed. Reluctance to accept external support, 
at all stages, due to issues of national sovereignty, confidentiality and trust was also observed. 
Need versus expressed demand. A number of interviewees raised the distinction between need and 
the actual demand expressed by governments. The question they raised was: how many 
governments that have a need for support are actually reaching out for it? And if they are not 
reaching out, why not? 
As a partial and tentative response to these questions, a number of the interviewees raised the issue 
of tension and conflict among ministries. Some ministries may want ownership over particular deals, 
and may therefore be reluctant to coordinate and collaborate with other ministries. They may also 
be less inclined to reach out for external assistance. Indeed, interviewees commented that on 
occasion where external advisors are retained, their ability to provide advice can be subverted. This 
is especially the case where the advisors have been retained by a different ministry and there is the 
perception that that ministry is trying to control the process. 
Alternatively the ministry that wishes to seek assistance may not have the authority or budget to 
engage support.  In many cases, the authority within government or of a state resources company to 
manage the negotiations and to approve final terms is unclear. The range of issues that need to be 
addressed in the negotiations is broad (including, for example, taxes, customs duties on imported 
equipment, immigration clearance for foreign personnel, relocation of local residents, 
environmental issues). These often require coordination by “the lead ministry,” which is often 
difficult to achieve and can be significantly complicated by bureaucratic and political rivalries. 
Sometimes a particular ministry already has its “trusted advisors” and prefers to keep the selection 
to these rather than seek new external assistance. Some countries have had long-term relationships 
with individual advisors, institutions or law firms. They may limit the selection of advisors to these 
pre-existing relationships or to advisors recommended through these relationships. 
Other possible reasons include limited knowledge of what assistance is available (many providers of 
subsidized or non-fee based assistance have limited resources and as a result are reluctant to market 
their services broadly), or some countries may have had negative experiences with donor assistance 
in terms of delays, quality, etc., making them reluctant to call on outside help. 
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Finally, in cases of weak governance and corruption, government officials prefer to maintain full 
control over the process to ensure maximum discretionary authority in the decision-making process 
rather than to call on external advisors who might limit opportunities for pay-offs. This would also 
suggest that, if they do employ advisors, corrupt government officials would prefer partial targeted 
assistance rather than support over the entire process, which would make pay-offs more difficult. 
The consideration of whether governments are willing to seek external advice raises a number of 
important questions. What makes those countries that have obtained good assistance different from 
others?  What have they developed in the way of skills internally?  How did they get their external 
advisors (and funding to pay for them)?  Some have noted that successful deployment of external 
advice is often linked to cases where the government pays directly. 
G. Key issues for discussion 
• For what purpose is expertise and support needed (e.g. to understand and negotiate 
investor-state contracts, contractor/supplier contracts, to improve power imbalances, to 
assess and support reforms to laws and regulations, etc.)? 
• What type of support is needed (e.g. technical assistance, training, access to resources, 
other) and for which activities? 
• What expertise is needed (e.g. legal, fiscal, geological, environmental, etc.)? 
• What are the barriers to developing country governments demanding advice? What are 
the barriers to advice being delivered effectively? 
• Is there a distinction between need and demand and if so, how can it be addressed? 
• Which parts of government are more willing to seek advice and at what stages? Are 
there patterns that we can observe?  
• Should there be attempts to provide assistance to governments that do not reach out 
for it? If so, how? 
• Are governments willing to pay for support and at what rates? When governments pay 




II. EXISTING SUPPORT AVAILABLE 
This section reviews sources of advice and support currently available to developing countries. The 
descriptions of the initiatives contained in this Section II and in Annex 2 are based on the research 
carried out and are provided for the purpose of stimulating discussion at the July workshop, at which 
corrections and comments are welcome where necessary. 
A. Overview 
Governments can and do procure paid advisory or legal services to assist them in their negotiations 
with private parties. In addition, a large number of organizations provide some level of free or 
subsidized support to governments for negotiation of long-term investment contracts.  This report 
provides an inventory, to the extent possible, of these organizations.  Table 2 and the subsequent 
text provide details about ten prominent initiatives for investment contract negotiations;11 Annex 2 
lists other bodies active in this area.  
A review of the support available to developing country governments shows that it ranges from 
assistance available in the investment environment and pre-negotiation phases (research, policy 
formulation, legislative and regulatory reform, preparation of bidding documents and term sheets, 
and evaluation of bidding proposals); to the contract negotiation phase itself.  Capacity building is 
also provided in these phases, though predominantly through short-term training courses.  Very few, 
if any, organizations provide support in the contract implementation phase of projects.   
Where assistance is available, it may in fact be very limited. An important limitation of available 
assistance, for example, is that it is often not available at the negotiating table. While some 
initiatives do provide direct support for negotiations, often at no cost to the governments, these 
initiatives are limited in their funding. A number of donors, who provide funding to allow 
governments to retain advisors, will not provide funding for direct negotiations.  
There appears to be a relatively large number of organizations providing short-term training courses 
to governments on areas related to long-term investment contracts.  In addition, there are a number 
of sources of non-fee paying or subsidized legal advice, either through bilateral arrangements with 
private law firms or through facilities set up to coordinate the provision of legal advice. While the 
government may not be paying fees for the advice, an external entity may be paying the fee (as the 
advice itself is not provided pro bono by all of these facilities).  
Expertise in financial and economic analysis is available, but less prevalent than legal assistance.  
Sector-specific and technical expertise appears to be the most difficult to find.  In particular, a key 
concern for investment banks or industry experts may be the potential for conflicts-of-interest which 
would preclude future work, which may dissuade firms or individuals from providing support to 
developing country governments. Moreover, even when conflicts-of-interest are not an issue, the 
advice may be limited by the lack of demand or the availability of funding, as discussed above. 
In addition to the organizations listed in table 2 below and Annex 2, a number of individuals (often 
academics and lawyers), retained as consultants, assist governments with tasks on an ad hoc basis 
(for example, drafting laws and regulations, preparing for negotiations, advising in negotiations).  
12 
   
This report does not list these individuals.  A number of academics, academic centers and law firms 
also provide bilateral support to governments on an ad hoc basis, either on a paid basis, or 
externally subsidized and therefore free for the government.  Such support is often through pre-
existing relationships between the individual, center or firm and the particular government.  These 
individual sources of support are not comprehensively identified in this report. 
Finally, some governments of middle income and high income developing countries may go to the 
market to obtain support from private firms in a manner similar to industrialized countries.  It 
appears that this is increasingly the case in South Asia and the Middle East. 
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Table 2: Prominent Initiatives for Negotiation Support 
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B. Prominent initiatives12 
1. African Legal Support Facility (ALSF) 
ALSF was established in 2009 as an independent institution housed in the African Development Bank 
(AfDB), in response to a call by finance ministers both in Africa and internationally to provide 
assistance to member countries struggling with vulture fund litigation. It has also provided support 
for complex negotiations. 
ALSF acts in response to requests for assistance from governments.  Because of its affiliation with 
the AfDB, ALSF’s point of entry is generally with ministries of finance.  However, once engaged, ALSF 
seeks involvement by ministries of justice/attorney generals’ offices on the team, as well as sector 
specific ministries if the project requires it.  On every project, ALSF asks for a “point person” to be 
nominated, preferably a lawyer and usually a tenured civil servant, in the relevant government 
agency and seeks to require that relevant ministries work together on projects.   
ALSF provides funds for governments to retain lawyers, and manages the procurement process 
which is essentially similar to AfDB’s procurement guidelines.  ALSF maintains a database of 
international lawyers with relevant expertise, who bid competitively for projects.  ALSF shortlists the 
respondents and assists the government with its selection.  ALSF requires that local lawyers be 
retained by the international lawyers on every project and usefully engaged (i.e. at the table, rather 
than acting as “drop boxes”), in order to build capacity of local lawyers.  International law firms are 
selected on the basis of their skills and fee package offered, as well as their commitment to capacity 
building during the project.  ALSF’s preferred scenario is that the international lawyers act as support 
to the local lawyers.  In addition, ALSF requires that international lawyers run training sessions for 
government lawyers and local lawyers, when they are in the country.   
ALSF usually obtains a discount on market rates (around 20% on hourly fees) and preferably seeks a 
fixed fee arrangement.  All fee payments are made directly by ALSF to the retained lawyers. 
ALSF seeks to monitor the provision of advice, but its ability depends on the particular engagement 
and the government’s willingness to disclose information.  ALSF requires monthly written reports 
from outside counsel, and calls or writes to the government representative monthly. 
ALSF has encountered a positive response from governments requesting assistance, which it 
attributes in many respects to the fact that governments perceive that they have a stake in the ALSF, 
given its relationship to the African Development Bank, and it is therefore not perceived as an 
external body providing advice. 
ALSF has also run four formal capacity-building sessions for African lawyers, which included complex 
commercial transaction in partnership with PALU and PPIAF (Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory 
Facility) at the World Bank.  ALSF is looking for other ways to provide capacity building facilities for 
African government and private lawyers. 
ALSF’s staff includes a director, five attorneys, a finance expert, and a three-person administrative 
staff.  With this staff, ALSF sometimes handles legal projects in-house, typically on shorter, 
straightforward, deals, but generally acts as the liaison between the country and the retained 
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counsel.  ALSF’s profile is higher in countries where it has a field office.  ALSF is funded by the AfDB, 
bilateral sources and regional development banks.   
Limitations: ALSF’s procurement process can lead to delays in making support available.  The Facility 
currently lacks the mandate to expand – e.g. ALSF has received requests to assist in broader areas 
such as law and policy drafting, but has declined.  ALSF is trying to develop “best practices” for 
projects, but this is difficult, particularly given the variety of sectors and common vs. civil law 
systems.  Financial, economic, and technical advice are not provided under the ALSF’s mandate.  No 
requests so far for assistance in deals with China.  No policy yet on assisting with renegotiations. 
2. African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET) 
ACET is an economic policy institute supporting the long-term growth with transformation of African 
economies.  It conducts research and analysis of economic policies and works for their 
implementation through direct advice to governments, advocacy, and knowledge-sharing among 
decision makers. ACET helps African countries use their natural resources to drive economic 
transformation through policy-oriented research, advice to governments, and capacity-building 
programs.  To date, ACET has partnered on capacity-building with the Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (NORAD), Petrad, Revenue Watch Institute (RWI), and the World 
Bank. With a core staff of twenty from eight African countries based in Accra, ACET brings an 
authentic African perspective, augmented by a vast network of leading thinkers throughout the 
world. 
Limitations: Work is primarily focused on policy-oriented research although some capacity building 
is undertaken. ACET has limited staff at present. 
3. International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
The IMF provides technical assistance in its areas of core expertise: macroeconomic policy, tax policy 
and revenue administration, expenditure management, monetary policy, the exchange rate system, 
financial sector stability, financial sector legislative frameworks, and macroeconomic and financial 
statistics.  The IMF has increasingly adopted a regional approach to the delivery of technical 
assistance and training. It operates eight regional technical assistance centers: in the Pacific; the 
Caribbean; East, West, Central, and Southern Africa; the Middle East; and Central America. The IMF 
is planning to open a second regional center in West Africa for non-francophone countries in the 
region. In addition to the regional centers the IMF provides technical assistance from headquarters 
financed internally, through multi-donor topical trust funds, and under schemes with bilateral 
donors. The IMF established a topical trust fund for managing natural resource wealth that started 
operations in 2011.  It aims to help resource-rich countries with their specific needs with respect to 
fiscal regimes and related contracts, revenue administration (incl. commitments under the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative), macroeconomic management, transparency arrangements, 
public financial management, asset and liability management, and statistics. The objective is to 
maximize the development benefits of natural resource wealth. The volume of IMF technical 
assistance in extractive industry issues has substantially expanded in recent years. 
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Limitations: Assistance is limited to IMF core areas of expertise.  The IMF is unwilling to provide 
assistance in actual negotiations. 
4. International Development Law Organization (IDLO)  
IDLO provides both training and technical assistance in relation to investment contracts, i.e. working 
with the beneficiary to prepare them for the negotiation.  Six years ago, IDLO also began assisting 
with institutional reform.  Because of IDLO’s policy of strict neutrality, IDLO experts have never 
participated in an actual negotiation with the investor.  Rather, they seek to enhance the capacity of 
beneficiaries to carry out negotiations themselves. 
In-house staff or external experts hired by IDLO travel to the country to conduct training workshops 
upon a specific request from a government, organization or donor.  IDLO generally sends in-house 
staff to run workshops, but if it does not have the required expertise it engages an external expert 
and designs the workshop or training course with that expert.  IDLO maintains a database of external 
experts it can draw upon when needed.  IDLO interviews proposed experts to ensure that they have 
the right experience and language skills; experts must have at least 10 years practical experience and 
regional expertise.  It then negotiates with the expert an arrangement making sure that the expert 
uses IDLO’s Training Methodology, Needs Assessment and Performance Objectives. 
IDLO exercises quality control on training events ensuring that IDLO’s training methodology is 
rigorously applied by IDLO managers, facilitators and consultants. 
The following are examples of relevant support (regarding investment contracts) IDLO has provided: 
• Workshops and training courses for relevant stakeholders within the government in 
Mozambique (Ministry for Mineral Resources, Ministry of Environment and Ministry of 
Finance) on oil, gas, natural resources, minerals law.  IDLO organized training on 
negotiation skills and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as well as on the drafting of 
bilateral investment treaties and concession agreements.  
• Courses aimed at strengthening the capacity of lawyers negotiating investment 
contracts (this course ran for 24 years and was discontinued in 2010 due to lack of donor 
funding). 
• Courses to local enterprises and investment lawyers on how to attract FDI and how to 
draft investment contracts including PPP infrastructure agreements (courses ran for 
many years and were also discontinued in 2010 due to lack of donor funding). 
• Courses on the negotiation of technology transfer agreements. 
Limitations: IDLO does not provide technical expert advice on a specific negotiation of a contract 
with an investor and is limited in funding for its capacity building programs.  
5. International Senior Lawyers Project (ISLP) 
ISLP provides training, onsite capacity-building, legislative and regulatory reform assistance and 
contract negotiation assistance to governments. In all cases, ISLP operates by providing highly 
experienced senior lawyers, on a pro bono basis, to serve as counsel and advisors to governments.  
ISLP currently has two paid staff members dedicated exclusively to its economic development 
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program. They work with clients and volunteers to develop the terms of reference of an advisory 
project and ensure that the project is effectively implemented, secure funding for the program, and 
manage the logistical and administrative aspects of each volunteer assignment. ISLP is currently 
seeking to fill a new staff or consultancy position that will focus exclusively on economic 
development work in Africa. 
Typically, governments or third parties make a request to ISLP when a need is identified.  
Governments that approach ISLP are generally those with which there is an established relationship, 
or where external contacts (e.g. the IMF, a counterpart in another country) have recommended ISLP.  
ISLP maintains a network of global law firms and senior lawyers, and requires that lead lawyers on 
projects must be partner level.  ISLP connects the government with one or more lawyers selected by 
ISLP for their specific expertise in the area of need. If the parties decide to go forward, ISLP signs an 
engagement letter along with the volunteer (individual or firm) and the government in question.  
ISLP monitors the engagement on an ongoing basis, with both the government and the volunteer 
(through ongoing and end-of-activity reports) and provides logistical support to the volunteer for 
arranging travel and meetings. 
In addition to support for actual negotiations or contract disputes, ISLP provides training and 
capacity development support.   Examples include: 
• High-level capacity building: practical workshops of 3.5 to 5 days duration, in Liberia, 
Tanzania and Mozambique, on topics including “an overview of international practices in 
negotiating and contracting,” “drafting investment contracts,” “fiscal and financial 
provisions,” “best practices for administration and management of mining contracts,” 
“how to manage uranium mining contracts,” and “legislative drafting.”  
• Some work on building capacity to monitor extractive-industry investment projects on 
an ongoing basis, including in the area of verifying the accuracy of tax receipts. 
• Assistance with the drafting of rules, regulations, and codes related to extractive sectors 
(in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique). 
• Ongoing assistance and advice to the Ministry of Finance in Liberia regarding the 
development of transfer pricing regulations and their application in particular matters 
and general international tax matters including treaties and information exchanges.  
Limitations: Although ISLP volunteers have spent significant periods in certain client countries and 
have ongoing and continuing relationships with ministries, it does not have any permanent presence 
in any recipient country.  This deficiency may be addressed in the next several months, when ISLP 
retains a full-time staff or consultant to focus exclusively on its economic development work in 
Africa. To date ISLP has been able to identify sufficient high quality volunteers to service the projects 
it accepts, but the number of projects it can evaluate and take on is limited by staff and funding for 
out-of-pocket and administrative expenses.   ISLP limits this aspect of its programs to very low 
income countries, e.g., Liberia, Sierra Leone and Malawi.   ISLP does not take on projects where 
governments can reasonably and timely secure paid counsel.  Subject to funding, ISLP could envisage 
expanding its support to other regions and sectors, although availability of qualified lawyers willing 
to do the work on a volunteer basis could become a constraint. ISLP is active in other sectors with 
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civil society and governments on economic development issues, human rights, and rule of law; in 
some cases these other activities may raise conflicts. 
6. Norad - Oil for Development (OfD) 
Oil for Development was launched in 2005 in order to focus Norway’s petroleum-related assistance 
on work that helps to improve revenue and environmental management in the oil sectors of 
resource-dependent developing countries.  OfD describes their assistance as “demand driven.”  
Requests for assistance, as well as funding to the OfD country programs, are usually channeled 
through the embassies. 
Oil for Development has arranged workshops preparing cooperating countries for negotiation with 
oil companies with regard to block allocations. However, OfD’s assistance stops just before the 
negotiating table. For political reasons, they decline to take active part in negotiations. OfD also 
collaborates with the World Bank Group on the Extractive Industries – Technical Advisory Facility (EI 
-TAF) (which is described below).  
Limitations: OfD is able only to provide support in the oil and gas sector, and does not provide direct 
assistance for actual negotiations. Experience on the ground has shown limited coordination in 
collaborating with other bodies providing assistance in the oil and gas sector, and a propensity to 
apply the Norwegian model over alternatives. 
7. Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU) 
PALU acts as an overarching association for regional and national lawyers’ associations in Africa.  
PALU’s mission statement includes legal capacity building, regional integration, and the bolstering of 
development initiatives geared toward socio-economic development and the rule of law.  PALU’s 
work is complemented by its relationships with the African Union and the African Development 
Bank.   
In 2010, AfDB’s African Legal Support Facility (ALSF) approved a $900,000 grant to PALU.  This 
partnership aims to increase the capacity of African lawyers to better engage in complex 
international commercial transactions and litigation, bringing together the private legal bar and 
governments (through an intergovernmental organization).  The joint capacity building project will 
train over 150 lawyers from across Africa.  Regional training seminars have been held for the 
Eastern, Southern, Northern and Western African regions in Kigali (February 2011), Cape Town (May 
2011), Tunis (January 2012) and Yaoundé (March 2012).  
The broad objectives of the project are: to take stock of the “state of play” in complex international 
commercial negotiations and dispute resolution across Africa; build a database of lawyers 
knowledgeable, skilled and experienced in complex international commercial negotiations and 
dispute resolution in Africa; facilitate increased and improved financing of infrastructure projects; 
sharpen international arbitration skills; develop the capacity of African lawyers to tackle vulture 
funds and better manage public debt; promote the activities of the African Legal Support Facility; 
and market PALU and motivate lawyers to join as fee-paying members. 
Limitations:  Workshops are short term so capacity building is not sustained. The initiative is not 
targeted to governments and does not provide direct assistance for negotiations. 
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8. Revenue Watch Institute (RWI) 
RWI is primarily involved in providing assistance to governments in their review of existing extractive 
industry contracts, planning for and assisting in the renegotiation of those contracts, and assessing 
the renegotiation process.  Infrequently, RWI has assisted with new investment contracts (including 
pre-negotiation preparation and negotiation itself).  RWI’s core expertise is in providing a 
development perspective, as well as advice on fiscal policy, economic modeling and analysis and 
good governance.  RWI advises oil- and mineral-rich governments on legislative and policy reform, 
and seeks to help governments link contract negotiations to these broader sectoral policy reforms.  
RWI’s team includes lawyers, economists and governance specialists.   
In their contributions to negotiation processes, RWI experts typically serve as members of a team of 
advisors, frequently involving sector experts (for example, in diamonds or in iron ore)and other 
lawyers from ISLP or retained by governments by other means. RWI has worked closely with UNDP 
in Sierra Leone and has had discussions about collaboration with lawyers arranged through the 
World Bank EI-TAF or through ALSF.  RWI has also worked closely with OfD and ACET in Sierra Leone 
and Liberia, providing assistance on the legal framework for petroleum and organizing capacity-
building workshops covering negotiation strategy, among other subjects. On some occasions, RWI 
assists the government to assemble its team for a particular project and on others RWI has been 
approached by another organization to join an established team.  
Maintaining regional offices in Ghana, Peru, Azerbaijan, Lebanon and Indonesia as well as staff on 
the ground in other countries in which RWI is active, assists in delivery of support.  For example, 
there is a readily available point of contact for government counterparts, communication is easier 
and there is the ability to respond quickly to new demands.  It is felt that this builds more trust into 
the relationship. 
Support is generally initiated by request from contacts in government in countries where RWI has a 
presence or as a result of RWI’s profile in these issues.  Alternatively, contact has been made 
through donors or staff on the ground. 
Beyond its support to governments, RWI provides extensive capacity building support to civil society 
groups, parliaments and other oversight actors throughout the world, including on the analysis and 
monitoring of extractive-industry contracts. 
Limitations: RWI does not, on its own, enter into traditional attorney-client relationships with 
government partners for negotiations; instead, it typically works as part of a team with private-
sector lawyers supporting the government, or provides over-arching advice to governments on 
contract strategy.  RWI’s ability to support negotiations in multiple countries is constrained as a 
function of available financial resources.  
9. UNDP – Regional Project for Capacity Development for Negotiation and Regulation of 
Investment Contracts 
The UNDP Regional Project for Capacity Development is no longer operational. The initiative 
provided support in a number of areas, with a mission to strengthen governance and transparency 
related to large-scale investment contracts, and a core focus on capacity building. 
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The Project provided and coordinated external expert support to African government officials in a 
number of disciplines, including financial, technical, industry specific, investment bankers and 
lawyers.  The Project benefited from active guidance from recognized academic experts and 
partnered with ISLP, RWI and Advocates for International Development.  Although external experts 
were engaged to provide technical assistance, the Project staff also provided technical assistance 
and actively managed the high level government relationships necessary for successful Project 
implementation.  The Project was managed through the regional UNDP/UNOPS offices in Dakar, 
Senegal.  In addition to leading international lawyers and other experts, project assistance to 
countries was also carried out with support from African lawyers in the region. Its key focus was the 
following: 
• Assistance with development and reform of policies, laws and regulations 
• Assistance with capacity building in evaluation of a country’s assets, setting up bids, 
understanding necessary documentation required to qualify bidders, evaluating bids 
• Training on drafting laws and regulation, and negotiations, including substantive issues 
largely related to the negotiation of large-scale mineral, oil and gas agreements  
• Briefing and preparing for negotiations 
• Assistance in negotiations 
Key strengths of this Project were its presence on the ground through the UNDP regional offices, 
balanced technical competence of its staff, and the staff’s ability to function at the highest levels in 
both English and French.  These attributes allowed Project staff to interact face to face and manage 
issues directly with high-level government officials, other stakeholders in-country and recipients of 
support.  This enabled the Project to develop relationships with government and relevant 
stakeholders, which strengthened the ability to deliver support by being perceived as trusted 
advisors.  As a result, within 12 months of being fully staffed, the Project grew from 5 Project 
beneficiary countries to 11 Project beneficiary countries at the specific and high-level request of the 
relevant African States. 
Limitations:  Hosting an initiative like this within a multilateral institution has limitations, for 
example, perceived political risks to the organization and shifting organizational priorities on 
“special” projects with leadership changes.  Additionally, the bureaucratic structure, rules and 
regulations of a multilateral institution are not optimal for a Project designed to provide significant 
technical expertise from the private sector and support negotiations with the private sector.  The 
Project was ultimately closed because of funding limitations and cuts.  
10. World Bank – Extractive Industries Technical Advisory Facility (EI-TAF) 
The EI-TAF is a multi-donor trust fund managed by the Oil, Gas and Mining Policy and Operations 
Division of the World Bank.  The EI-TAF aims to facilitate rapid response advisory services to 
developing country governments for capacity building and to prepare governments for extractive 
industry projects, including contract negotiations and associated policy reforms and frameworks.  
Services are demand-driven and there has recently been a trend towards requests for assistance in 
relation to evaluations of the interface between mining and infrastructure proposals.   
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The EI-TAF provides funds to governments – generally an award of around $500,000 – and 
government carries out the procurement to assemble the required team of experts.  The World Bank 
maintains a list of consultants with particular expertise.  The procurement process is monitored by 
the World Bank under its procurement rules, including the provision of a report detailing the reasons 
for selection of each expert. Where the country does not have the capacity to undertake the 
procurement process, the World Bank will carry it out on the country’s behalf.  Generally a multi-
disciplinary team of 5-7 experts is assembled, which includes legal, financial, sector, commodity, 
environmental and social expertise.  Increasingly, there is also a physical infrastructure specialist 
(e.g. roads, rail, and port as relevant).  Ministries are required to nominate counterpart specialists, 
who will work with the experts in order to develop capacity.   
Experts are engaged at market rates and the funding generally lasts around 8-10 months.  The 
general turn-around time from request to engagement is around 2-3 months. 
According to its 2010 Progress Report, EI-TAF is able to respond to country needs for advisory 
assistance on a much faster basis than traditional World Bank lending and technical assistance 
instruments.  EI-TAF works on a first-come / first-served basis and the projects are reviewed and 
decided in a single meeting.   
A meeting is convened with donors to the EI-TAF trust twice a year to go through the countries to 
which assistance has been provided.  The World Bank is currently working on developing new 
measures for success of projects.  
Limitations:  Governments have commented that provision of assistance on occasion is not fast 
enough. Procurement and financial management issues were slow when the grants were recipient-
executed (managed by the government).  However, since April 2012 the donors and EI-TAF program 
management have switched to largely World Bank-executed implementation arrangements. 
Assistance is not provided for negotiations themselves. The position of EI-TAF is that governments 
themselves should be driving the negotiations, although there may also be concerns which stem 
from key World Bank shareholders or trust fund donors. 
In addition to these ten key initiatives, an inventory of other mechanisms of support is provided in 
Annex 2.  This list is not intended to be exhaustive and comments are invited during the workshop. 
C. Key issues for discussion 
• Among the existing initiatives, which are the ones that stand out as particularly 
effective, and why? What are the main limitations? 
• Is there any particular stage in the contracting process where these initiatives need 
focus in particular (pre-negotiations, negotiations, monitoring etc…)? 
• Where is there overlap among existing initiatives? 
• What lessons can be learned from existing initiatives in relation to dealing with issues of 
impartiality, conflict of interest and trust? 
• Based on the review of existing initiatives is it possible to say what an appropriate type 
of specialist support should look like? Is it possible to develop a set of criteria for 
26 
   
‘appropriate / effective’ support?  What about the role of advisors and their position on 
certain issues? 
• What are examples of countries that have received effective support? How do they 
manage the process of obtaining external advisors (and funding to pay for them), as well 
as using the advice? What it was about the support which made a difference? What 
types of skills were developed internally? 
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III WHAT IS MISSING 
This section of the report reviews the gaps that have been identified in the current range of sources 
of assistance for negotiation support.  
1. Expertise other than legal 
The review in the previous section shows that there are organizations providing legal support in all 
phases of negotiations, albeit the support is limited for specific negotiations (see below) and for 
monitoring and implementation.  In addition, there are a number of programs that provide capacity 
building on legal issues.  Non-legal experts are less readily available – for example, 
financial/economic experts, financial modelers, sector experts, investment bankers for financial 
structuring, and development specialists. 
The weakest area in terms of availability of support relates to assistance targeted to industry-
specific technical expertise. A knowledge gap usually exists between the government and the 
investor (e.g. geological data and its interpretation, global sector trends, technology developments, 
sustainable development challenges, environmental management). Governments often do not 
possess industry-specific commercial skills or access to critical information (global commodity 
market trends, commodity pricing trends and systems, consumer trends).  The presence of an 
industry specialist on the team can help build the government’s credibility and confidence when 
dealing with the company’s negotiating team. 
A number of respondents commented that it can be a challenge, in particular, to find strong industry 
experts, due to conflict-of-interest issues. Industry experts often work for investors and may 
therefore display reluctance to work for governments. It was also noted by several respondents that 
governments can show a reluctance to bring in external experts associated with industry for fear of 
breaches of confidentiality. Governments may also not have the ability to pay the fees charged by 
these experts or may not even be aware of the need for this expertise. 
In addition, governments may need assistance in the management aspects relating to assembling a 
negotiating team to prepare for and carry out a negotiation, including but not limited to identifying 
experts that are required in addition to lawyers. An external advisor can also be helpful in managing 
internal government negotiations. 
2. Limitations of existing legal assistance  
a) Limitations of non-fee paying legal assistance 
A number of initiatives exist to provide non-fee based or subsidized legal advice to governments. 
However, these initiatives are often limited in their funding and therefore the amount of support 
they are able to provide. Moreover, as mentioned previously, a number of donors that provide 





   
b) Limitations of specialty, timeframe and scope of existing legal assistance 
It was noted that legal experts retained may not have specialist experience in the relevant sector 
(e.g. extractive industries), or in working with and serving the needs of government. For example, 
transactional lawyers may tend to focus on “getting the deal done,” which may not include a long 
term view of the terms of the deal for the country or revenue management issues. Moreover, the 
assistance may be limited in timeframe or scope according to the resources and mandate of the 
external initiative rather than by the needs of the government. Strong monitoring standards should 
be implemented to ensure that the advice provided is real, tangible and practical. It is preferable for 
lawyers to be involved over a long term, in order to develop relationships with government clients. 
c) Limitations of experience and relationships with the government 
Without experience working with governments, the experts may not have the incentive (or the 
experience) to create ownership within the broader confines of government, for example, working 
slowly in order to obtain buy-in from competing government groups for the negotiation strategy. 
This may therefore ultimately not translate into good outcomes for the country. Indeed, one 
respondent commented that key success factors for the provision of support are:  (a) providers of 
support should have the confidence and trust of governments; (b) there has to be buy-in and 
political will at the top; (c) the approach must be conciliatory rather than antagonistic (if advisors 
create a rift between governments and investors, the resulting acrimony will be prejudicial); (d) the 
support must enable governments to articulate their own visions; and (e) the support must provide 
the government with the capacity to achieve the vision and promote governance in addition to 
carrying out a short term transaction. Experience working with governments, as well as long term 
involvement as discussed below, is important in order to understand and be able to address these 
issues.   
d) Limitations imposed by government procurement processes and funding  
A government’s ability to engage effective legal advice may be affected by its procurement 
processes. These processes may require that legal services are engaged by tender, with the contract 
generally being awarded to the lowest bid. In some cases, this may mean that the government does 
not receive the highest quality advice. For example, in order to “get a foot in the door,” firms may 
bid low prices and then provide more junior (and less experienced) lawyers to work on the project. 
In some cases, the fee arrangement may also be subsequently renegotiated (and increased) over the 
course of the engagement, if the fees were unrealistic at the outset.  
On other occasions, governments may wish to retain experienced counsel, but are impeded by lack 
of available funding sources, meaning that it may be impossible, or a long process, to engage their 
desired counsel.  
3. Timing of support 
Governments often do not seek help with negotiations at an early stage, putting them at a 
disadvantage in the negotiations from the outset. On occasion, negotiations have already 
commenced (sometimes even after the term sheet has been agreed) before external assistance is 
sought.  This may mean, for example, that certain options have not been considered, leading to a 
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less advantageous contract.  Late requests for assistance might be due to political sensitivities, to 
inexperience, to lack of funding and to the desire to maintain control over the negotiation. 
Respondents underlined that for the best negotiating outcomes it was important for the 
government to put together the negotiating team, including both officials and external advisors, at 
the very start of the process rather than bring in experts part way through, and to the extent 
possible, to maintain the same negotiating team throughout the negotiation. Providing resources, 
tools and assistance even before the negotiating process starts—for instance, with drafting model 
contracts, policy reviews and formation, and industry research—can also be instrumental in shaping 
successful negotiations. 
4. Support following conclusion of a contract – implementation phase 
There is a significant gap in the availability of support to governments following the conclusion of a 
contract. The governments’ tasks here are to ensure contract compliance (both in terms of financial 
and fiscal elements, and for environmental and social performance), and to plan for end-of-life 
activities such as environmental cleanup, labor creation for affected communities, etc.  
Other than limited capacity-building workshops, there does not appear to be support dedicated to 
the implementation, enforcement and monitoring of the contracts or to strengthening 
governments’ capacity to do so.  
5. Long-term assistance 
Many of the initiatives provide assistance for particular projects and for limited phases of those 
projects only.  The assistance is not provided over the long term, to build up a particular ministry, 
agency or national resource company.  Respondents commented that an external advisor 
“parachuting” in and out does not serve the capacity building needs of governments.  Rather, it is 
important to become a “trusted advisor” in order to provide capacity building, and this needs to be 
built up over a period of time.  Short-term training sessions are also of limited benefit. 
While model contracts may be available, host-country negotiators may not understand where they 
can deviate from the terms, or the company may try to refuse to negotiate from the model. In 
addition, model contracts need to be used carefully, understanding that each project should be 
independently evaluated and may require different terms. In addition, without significant 
experience gained through practice in negotiations, in the face of company’s negotiating teams and 
political pressure, it can be difficult to maintain a strong position or to know which way to go on 
particular issues.  This sort of experience cannot be taught in short term training sessions. 
An example was provided of long term assistance provided to the Indonesian government by 
advisors from Harvard University who were involved in Indonesia for about 20 years.  Expatriate 
advisors, experts in economics, planning and law, were based in two critical ministries with long-
term commitments (of around 2 years or longer).  Over that time, the resident advisors brought in 
short-term experts from abroad as needed, but the residents themselves remained on the ground to 
help officials implement the advice, or to help modify it as problems arose.  
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One respondent commented that it is important for governments to determine what kind of 
expertise to develop internally, which would be addressed by long term capacity building, and what 
should be outsourced.   
6. Knowledge management and knowledge sharing 
There is generally a lack of availability of documentation. For example, there are few documents 
describing “best practices” in terms of policy frameworks, legal and fiscal terms, contract provisions, 
etc.., as applicable to common law and civil law countries.  In addition, accessing past or existing 
contracts as precedents, models or for comparison can be difficult. There is limited knowledge 
sharing between countries and regions of concluded contracts and related documents and there can 
also be a lack of co-ordination between different teams (e.g., across different sectors) within one 
country. Countries also lack contract management systems to enable monitoring and enforcement 
of contractual terms over the long term of the project. In contrast, in the private sector, companies 
or firms are able to access many other industry contracts, either through the firm’s own precedent 
system or through specialized subscription databases. Here, better knowledge sharing mechanisms 
and resources would be useful for building in-country knowledge and precedents. 
Ideally governments would use model contracts and associated standard documentation in the key 
sectors: mining, oil and gas, forestry, toll roads, water and sanitation plants, independent power 
plants, etc., with clear guidance on the fact that they must be adapted to the context of the 
particular deal. However, these specialized resources are not readily available. 
Finally, there is limited opportunity for local experts to get exposure to similar transformative, 
large-scale transactions. Unlike experts of industrialized countries who have more international 
flexibility to develop their practice on a wider geographical scope, local experts have limited 
occasions to develop experience in negotiations in house. 
The lack of institutional knowledge is exacerbated within governments by high staff turnover in 
government agencies, which means that the skills and ability to build institutional knowledge are 
lost. More formalized knowledge-sharing mechanisms could be useful in this respect. 
7. Sector focus of available support 
Most of the existing initiatives provide support for negotiations of oil, mining and gas contracts but 
now there is an emerging focus on other major investment contracts, such as for land or 
infrastructure projects. 
One respondent commented that it would be helpful to understand the evolving needs of 
government in new areas where support is required.  For example, in South Asia and the Middle East 
where governments and local firms have developed capacity for negotiations of natural resource 
contracts, they are now increasingly negotiating agreements relating to pipelines and transportation 
where their knowledge is less extensive.  Assistance in building up capacity, and the ability to share 
knowledge between countries and develop “best practices” in those areas is needed. 
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A. Key issues for discussion 
• Does the above review accurately represent the gaps between the identified needs of 
governments and the available support? 
• Specifically, where are there gaps in terms of type of expertise? Geographic focus? Type 




IV HOW TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE SUPPORT 
This paper posits that in order to achieve more robust and balanced contracts governing major 
investments, it would be useful for developing country governments to be able to call on world class 
legal, technical and financial skills that they do not possess, as well as to increase their own capacity 
in those fields (Section I). In the prior review of existing support, it should be noted that while a large 
number of support initiatives exist (Section II), there remain significant gaps (Section III). This section 
poses a number of key questions as to whether and how existing sources of support could usefully 
be complemented to ensure comprehensive support. It is designed to foster discussion concerning 
various possible options. 
A. Objectives 
Clear objectives must be set in the context of criteria to be considered in evaluating the sufficiency 
of existing mechanisms and/or the need for any new mechanisms, as well as to determine the 
appropriate mechanism going forwards (if any). As has been discussed in the sections above, some 
of the important criteria to consider include (but are not limited to) the following. 
• Advice is needed in integrated specializations, including but not limited to, legal support, 
financial and business expertise, geological and technical expertise, environmental 
expertise, and other areas of knowledge, outlined in section I and Annex 1 of this report. 
• Advice and assistance is needed at all stages of the contracting process, from the pre-
contracting phases (of designing model contracts and drafting legislation) through 
implementation, as outlined in detail in section I and Annex 1. Different skills would be 
required in each of these phases. 
• Technical support needs to be high quality, based on extensive field experience. 
• Relationships with the government are important, and long-term, resident relationships can 
be helpful in that respect. 
• Tools and resources that provide increased access to information (including contracts, other 
legal frameworks, etc…) can help to level the field in terms of access to precedents and 
information. 
• Capacity building needs to be structured, long term and often resident where possible. 
• Funding mechanisms are important to consider, as they may impact aspects of the advice, 
such as the buy-in of the government and sufficiency of resources for the provision of 
assistance, among other things.  
B. Consideration of mechanisms to provide support 
There are a number of options that could be considered as mechanisms to address the gaps.  For 
instance, one or a combination of the following options may be explored. 
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• Working with some of the existing initiatives to expand their support to sectors and regions 
currently not covered.  This may include expanding technical and financial support as well as 
making available precedent documents, knowledge management systems and other tools 
and resources.   
• Creating a mechanism to coordinate existing sources of support, drawing on the strengths of 
each.   
• Creating a new initiative, either targeted at the gaps identified or comprehensive in design.  
A new initiative could deliver support in a number of ways, for example, it may be directed 
at providing the tools, resources and/or innovative approaches described below, it may 
address the gaps in existing support, coordinate existing support, it could provide 
comprehensive support, or a combination of these options.    
• Designing improved tools and resources (as discussed in part C below), as well as new 
creative ways to support governments (e.g., through the use of the media and social 
networking to enable widespread sharing and comparison of information and pricing 
information, contract norms and outcomes, problem-solving frameworks
13
 to assist 
governments with developing plans and negotiaion strategy). These could be delivered 
through any mechanism which is taken forward. 
It could be argued that support to the government at every phase of an investment project – from 
the pre-negotiation phase, to the negotiation phase and contract implementation phase – by one 
organization would be the ideal option, because of the overall consistency and seamlessness that 
this would present in terms of advice. The question must however be asked whether this approach is 
indeed feasible or practical given the scale that such support would require and given the number of 
initiatives already successfully providing certain types of support. In this regard, a new initiative may 
better be targeted at coordinating this existing support and filling any gaps, in both resources and 
tools available. 
It should be determined whether it is indeed feasible or desirable to combine all required skills 
within one initiative, and if it is what the pros and cons are of such an approach. (Were a new 
initiative to be considered, Annex 3 provides some options for its institutional structure.) 
Finally, if it is not necessary or possible for support to be provided effectively at all stages of the 
process and for all relevant skills within one initiative, consideration must be given to where the 
addition of more limited support should be concentrated, or which areas or activities should initially 
be given priority. 
C. The need for tools, resources and long-term capacity building 
A first (or ongoing) step that may be taken, whichever of the options is pursued, is to create useful 
tools and resources to be made available to developing country governments to expand on the few 
tools already available (for example, the Extractive Industries Source Book, the Model Mineral 
Development Agreement, and the Natural Resource Charter, all listed in Annex 2). Tools and 
resources could be provided through whichever type mechanism is adopted (e.g., through a 
coordinating mechanism or a new initiative). 
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These may include databases of contracts (perhaps coordinated with the World Bank Institute 
initiative listed in Annex 2) together with appropriate guidance as to the need to ensure that each 
contract must be specific to the deal at hand, websites providing comparisons of countries’ legal and 
fiscal regimes and infrastructure arrangements, fiscal and economic analysis tools (such as that being 
developed by SNR Denton and ACT Financial Consulting, listed in Annex 2), geological databases and 
expert databases. A toolkit that was commissioned by the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation 
(based in Canada) as a resource for First Nation, Inuit and Métis communities in Canada considering 
impact and benefit agreements (such as those with mining companies) may serve as a useful 
example. 14 While the toolkit focuses on the mining industry, many of the issues and processes 
addressed in the toolkit are relevant in other sectors and contexts. The toolkit is being rolled out 
with training sessions in Aboriginal communities and is being taken up by Aboriginal communities as 
well as their advisers. Many of the issues faced by Aboriginal communities in negotiations of impact 
and benefit agreements with investors parallel those faced by developing country governments. 
D. Key issues for discussion 
• How can existing initiatives be supported or expanded?  Is a new initiative needed? 
• Which of these gaps should this process focus on and at which stage in the contracting 
process (legislative drafting, pre-negotiations, negotiations, monitoring etc…)? 
• Should this process cover all kinds of complex commercial contracts (e.g. investment and 
other commercial contracts)? Or which types of contracts should be prioritized? 
• Is it feasible to combine all the types of legal/ economic/geological/industry assistance 
in one mechanism/initiative? 
• Should this process have a global focus or is a regional focus more feasible? 
• What types of tools, activities or resources could usefully be developed and made 
available to assist governments in negotiations? Are there other creative/innovative 
possibilities for providing support? 
• Exploratory discussion: what types of institutional arrangements might help ensure 
comprehensive support? Could a few ideas be piloted to help inform the design of any 





Annex I: Analysis of needs to support developing countries in their contract negotiations  
(Based on outcomes of the Berlin 2011 workshop, desk research, and interviews with international experts and government officials) 
Typical Activity Goals with Respect to the Activity Needs of Support with Respect to the Activity 
SETTING THE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT 
Formulate gov-
ernment  policies 
and strategies 
 Sound policies providing 
guidance/information relevant for the 
negotiation of a complex contract. (e.g., 
FDI and fiscal policies, national 
development strategy, sector strategies). 
2011 Action Plan of the “Africa Mining Vision”
1
: There is need to build capacity and 
enhance skills of government officials in formulating policies, laws and regulations. 
International Expert:  Assistance is needed for the development of a national vision. 
This is crucial for a successful outcome of the negotiations in providing direction and 
guiding principles to the negotiation team. Capacity development is needed with 
respect to policy formulation, statutory and technical issues. 
Berlin Workshop 2011 Report: Improved assistance involves building long-term 




 Unambiguous comprehensive legislation 
and regulations. 
 Model contracts (according to best 
practices) to minimize discretion in the 
contract negotiating process, with 
guidance as to which provisions may be 
altered in the course of negotiation. 
                                                            
1
 African Union Commission, African Development Bank, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2011). “Building a sustainable future for Africa’s extractive industry: From vision to 
action. Action Plan for implementing the African Mining Vision.” Addis Ababa. 
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Typical Activity Goals with Respect to the Activity Needs of Support with Respect to the Activity 
Conduct sector-
wide analyses and 
strategies 
 
 Good understanding of resource or 
infrastructure potential, providing 
guidance/information relevant for the 
negotiation of a complex contract (e.g., oil 






 Obtain crucial information that defines 
the framework of the contract through 
feasibility studies, geological or micro-
economic studies etc.  
Berlin Workshop 2011 Report: Assistance is needed early in the process, e.g., before the 
exploration phase (important when the license is bundled to the exploration license) or 
before a privatization.  
Governmental Official:  Support is needed to obtain sound geological information 
which is crucial for extractive industries projects. Geological expertise is most needed. 
International Expert: Capacity development is needed to bridge the knowledge gap 
between the government and the investor: development of industry specific technical 
expertise (e.g., geological data, global sector trends, sustainable development 
challenges, environmental management) and development of industry specific 
commercial skills (e.g., global commodity market trends, global commodity pricing 
systems, consumer trends).  The parties should go into the negotiation as equal 







 Obtain crucial information on adverse 
impacts of a project through 
environmental, social and safety impact 
assessments to be considered in the 
contract. 
 Prevention, mitigation or rehabilitation of 
potentially adverse impacts on 
environment, human health and social 







 Well-drafted and comprehensive 
tendering documents/term sheet. 
Preparation of/input to the draft 
contract/term sheet by legal counsel with 
sector expertise, sector experts. 
 
Berlin Workshop 2011 Report: Assistance is needed in setting competitive bidding 
processes.   
Government officials/International experts: Legal Assistance is needed for contract 
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Typical Activity Goals with Respect to the Activity Needs of Support with Respect to the Activity 
Manage the 
tendering process 
 Identify the “best” contracting party 
through a sound, competitive (if possible 
and suitable in the circumstances), 
inclusive and transparent tender 
process. 
formulation (see also the Negotiation Phase).  
Government Official: In view of the highly complex nature of the activities involved in 





 An appropriate and sound financial 
structure. 
 
Several government officials/international experts: There is a need for financial analysts 
and investment bankers. Some added that those are needed only on a short-term basis 
for the specific transaction. One government adviser mentioned that countries in Africa 






 Determination of a national position 
taking into account the positions of all 
relevant stakeholders. Determination of 
areas of higher and lesser priority in 
which concessions to the other party can 
be made. 
 Preparation of all documents & research 
of issues in consultation with other 
experts, as necessary, to bolster the 
Government’s negotiation position. 
Berlin Workshop Report/Government Officials/International Experts: Support is needed 
to strengthen the negotiation capacity of governments when they negotiate complex 
contracts. Improved assistance through “training that is long enough to cover the full 
process, including building negotiation skills and not only technical skills.” 
International Expert: There is a need for a high level (national) position on the key 
issues reached by a government before the negotiation team enters the negotiation 
room (so that the team has sufficient directions on which issues it may negotiate). 
Develop  
negotiation 
 A clear and effective negotiation 
strategy 
Lessons Learned from the External Assistance provided for the Liberia Renegotiations
2
: A 
clear and effective negotiation strategy is needed as it can make a significant difference 
to the outcome of the negotiations. Training programs are needed which should 
                                                            
2
 Raja Kaul, Antoine Heuty and Alvina Norman. 2009.  Getting a better deal from the Extractive Sector. Concession Negotiation in Liberia 2006-2008. Revenue Watch Institute. Washington.  
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Typical Activity Goals with Respect to the Activity Needs of Support with Respect to the Activity 
strategy include leadership and teamwork, concession negotiation management and strategy, 
negotiator training for complex negotiations. 
Research of the World Economic Forum’s Responsible Mineral Development Initiative 
interviewing stakeholders of 13 countries in three regions: capacity building needs 







 An effective multi-disciplinary 
negotiation team which is composed in a 
professionally balanced manner (i.e., all 
relevant ministries) and comprises all 
relevant disciplines. 
Lessons Learned from the External Assistance provided for the Liberia Renegotiations: A 
multi-disciplinary negotiation team comprising individuals with different backgrounds, 
skills and experience (e.g., with significant mining, environmental, investment banking, 
finance, legal, and management experience) is needed in order to have a successful 
outcome of renegotiations.   
International Expert: Governments need assistance in assembling a negotiating team.  
Berlin Report/Several Government Officials and International Experts: Legal, financial 
(modeling), geological, environment experts are needed for the negotiation of the 
contract.  
 
Governmental official: Capacity building is needed for these disciplines.  
                                                            
3
 World Economic Forum. (2011). Research Report. Stakeholders Perceptions and Suggestions. Responsible Mineral Development Initiative 2010. Geneva. 
39 
   





 An effective and smooth negotiation 
where both parties are on an equal 
playing field (with the same information, 
expertise and understanding of the 
available options). 
 
 A contract which is well-drafted, 
responsive to changing circumstances 
and fair to both parties. 
Literature: Expert negotiators are needed as a means for a developing country to 




Several Government Officials: They need short-term outside experts for the support of 
negotiations of bigger transactions. 
Lessons Learned from the External Assistance provided for the Liberia Renegotiations: 
Support (i.e. legal support complemented by industry-specific, financial and other 
support) is needed for the negotiation of the contract: preparing proposals and 
counter-proposals on specific provisions; drafting language for resolving conflicts, 
modeling financial projections of the impact to changes in government's positions; 
helping finding viable compromises to apparent “deadlock” situations, advising on the 
implications and ramifications of proposed positions.  External advisors should advise 
the government negotiators, but not be at the negotiating table themselves. 




 Contract compliance is monitored/ 
ensured (e.g., with respect to 
operational, fiscal, financial, 
environmental and social obligations) and 
plan for end-of-life activities 
(environmental clean-up, labor creation 
for affected communities). 
 
 Institutions/mechanisms are built for 
contract monitoring (specialized 
Draft Revisions to the Natural Resource Charter
5
: The fundamental issue is not so much 
the design of environmental and social legislation and regulations, but rather the 
capacity of government agencies at national, and importantly, at local levels to 
monitor and enforce environmental and social laws and regulations. 
Several Government Officials: Countries need capacity building of government officials 
for the monitoring of the contract. 
Government Adviser/Official: Governments prefer to have the monitoring of the 
contract done by their own people. Capacity-building is needed to understand the 
                                                            
4 Radon, Jenik (2007). Chapter 4: How to negotiate an Oil Agreement. Columbia University, New York. 
5 Draft revisions to the Natural Resource Charter, December 2011: http://www.naturalresources.org 
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Typical Activity Goals with Respect to the Activity Needs of Support with Respect to the Activity 
monitoring agencies as a large taxpayer 
unit). 
 
specific field relevant for monitoring the contract implementation (e.g., finances, 
exports, internal pricing). 
Berlin Workshop Report/Government Adviser: Improved assistance should involve 
building long-term relationships with governments to develop and improve 
enforcement capacity. 
Literature: Capacity-building is needed with respect to the calculation and collection of 
revenues from projects (e.g., taxes).
6
  
State agencies should be equipped with knowledge and training to be able to credibly 
monitor contract compliance. The State must ensure that it has the capacity to 
effectively review, evaluate and to take appropriate and timely action on environmental 





                                                            
6 Bryan Land (2009). Capturing a fair share of fiscal benefits in the extractive industry. Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 1; UNCTAD, Geneva and New York, p. 170  
7 John Ruggie.(2011). Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. General 
Assembly Resolution of 25 May 2011. A/HRC/17/31/Add.3. United Nations. New York, paragraph 30, p.12 
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Annex 2: Other Organizations Providing Support to Developing Countries for Contract Negotiations
8
 
Adam Smith International (ASI) 
Legal, financial, policy, capacity building 
ASI is an international advisory firm with an extractive industries practice that provides consulting 
services to both international investors and host governments. Key services include political and 
risk analysis, assistance with legal, fiscal and legislative reform (including issuance of mineral 
rights and the licensing regime associated with exploration and mining) as well as institutional 
reform meant to strengthen the capacity of government ministries to better manage the energy 
sector. ASI is particularly active in the mining arena. In working with governments, ASI develops 
regulations that enable licensing, monitoring and safe and responsible business practices.  ASI has 
also launched a training course on extractive industries governance. 
ABA Rule of Law Initiative  
Legal, capacity building 
Develops and supports legal education, governance and anti-corruption programs throughout the 
world.   
Advocates for International Development (A4ID) 
Legal  
A4ID has three broad areas of assistance – non-fee based legal advice, awareness raising (through 
a resource center containing reports and legal guides prepared by legal partners) and an events 
and training program (for both legal partners and development partners). 
Legal advice is provided to those who qualify as “development partners”, which can include 
developing country governments, charities, NGOs, inter-governmental organizations, social 
enterprises, bar associations and law societies.  The criteria to qualify include that the 
development partner must “abide by strong and transparent systems of governance and 
                                                            
8
 This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but is an indication of sources of support available.  Comments are invited during the workshop on additional sources of support not identified in 
Annex 2. 
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accountability” and if it is an organization, it cannot make its assistance contingent on religious or 
political affiliation.  A4ID also maintains a network of legal partners.  Development partners 
submit a request for legal assistance and A4ID matches them with a legal partner.   
Support has been provided in Africa, Asia and Central and South America. 
African Mineral Development Center (AMDC) The AMDC will be established to strategically coordinate the implementation of the African 
Mining Vision (AMV). The AMDC will coordinate activities including the provision of technical 
support for the implementation of the AMV, identifying gaps and areas of need potential 
expertise to address those needs, undertake and coordinate policy research, undertake advocacy 
and information dissemination, monitor and evaluate activities relating to the implementation of 
the AMV and provide a think tank capacity for the AMV and the activities around it. 
Ausaid – Mining for Development program 
Capacity building 
Launched in October 2011.  Provides assistance through scholarships, study programs and 
research assistance, in Africa and Asia-Pacific, particularly focused on improving governance. 
Also, through this Mining for Development program, the International Mining for Development 
Center (IM4DC) was established, which will provide access to education and training, as well as 
technical and other advice, including through short courses in Australia and overseas, fellowships 
in Australia, mentoring and capacity building of local institutions, publishing guides and tools and 
conference and alumni events and support.  IM4DC is targeting capacity in three areas - 
governance and regulation, community and environmental sustainability and operational 
effectiveness and safety.  IM4DC does not have any courses planned at present that offer 
coaching on negotiations directly, although as its activities are aimed at building capacity in 
mining governance it is intended that will enhance negotiating capacity.  Country needs 
assessments and scoping studies may well identify need for direct capacity building in 
negotiations in certain jurisdictions, although this would be generic rather than aimed at any 
particular project. 
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Brookings Institution 
Policy 
Provides substantial research and policy recommendations through its "Africa Growth Initiative", 
which focuses on 5 areas - macroeconomic management and the political economy, industrial 
policy, modernizing agriculture, managing natural resource exploitation and poverty alleviation 
and social protection. 
Centre for Energy, Petroleum, and Mineral Law 
and Policy (CEPMLP) 
Legal expertise, capacity building 
CEPMLP is the lead Consultant for the Extractive Industries Source Book project.   It is the largest 
graduate school in the world for the study of law, policy, economics, and management of the 
international petroleum, mining, and energy sectors.  CEPMLP provides consultancy services to 
government. 
CEPIL (Centre for Public Interest Law) 
Legal expertise 
CEPIL is a Ghana-based non-profit organization providing research and guidance to promote 
public interest law, particularly in the area of extractive rights. CEPIL helped implement the IIED-
led “Legal tools” training program in Ghana. 
Commonwealth Secretariat 
Technical Expertise 
The Commonwealth Secretariat’s Strategic Plan has two “goals” (peace and democracy and pro-
poor growth and sustainable development), through which it has built programs to assist 
Commonwealth countries to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.   
Until around 10 years ago, the Commonwealth Secretariat had an active technical cooperation 
program which provided support to governments in relation to negotiations for investment 
contracts, particularly related to natural resources.  The in-house team was led by a number of 
experts in the field, which had the ability to assemble teams with the necessary expertise for 
particular transactions (including lawyers, financial experts and industry experts). However, the 
technical cooperation program ceased to be funded, the in-house experts who founded the 
program ended their terms, and the program has not been maintained. 
Extractive Industries Source Book The EI Source Book is a free online, interactive resource that provides a narrative analysis of the 
sector, supplemented by downloads and other web resources, including specially commissioned 
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reports, summaries and briefs. The EI Source Book is principally intended for use by senior 
government officials and decision makers and by supporting domestic and international technical 
specialists. It focuses on sector policy, legal and regulatory development and administration, fiscal 
issues, and their linkages to broader impacts across the economy. 
The EI Source Book is a partnership between the World Bank Group, a global consortium of 
universities led by the University of Dundee, and non-governmental organizations. 
Foundation for International Environmental Law 
and Development (FIELD) 
Legal expertise 
FIELD is a wholly independent organization working with IIED to provide legal services to 
disadvantaged countries, communities and campaigners negotiating for fairer international 
environmental laws.  FIELD’s three principal thematic areas are multilateral environmental 
treaties, accountability and good governance, and energy and investment.  Work in the energy 
and investment theme appears to involve research and policy related publications, to date a 
publication on ‘Opening Up Oil and Gas Policy in Kazakhstan’. 
International Bar Association (IBA) 
Legal expertise, capacity building 
The IBA is an international association of lawyers and lawyers' associations whose purpose is to 
influence the development of international law reform and positively shape the future of the legal 
profession worldwide.   IBA’s Oil and Gas Law Committee and Mining Law Committee have been 
particularly active in developing frameworks that balance the needs and rights of both host 
countries and international investors.  
Most significantly, IBA’s Model Mining Development Agreement (MMDA) brings together 
“international best practice principles” into a negotiation template for investor-state agreements 
in the mining sector in developing countries. The MMDA is intended to be used as a non-
prescriptive negotiation tool for mining development agreements where either ‘mature’ mining 
codes are not in place or a mining code requires supplementation by private contract.  
International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED) 
IIED covers five central research themes: natural resources, climate change, human settlements, 
sustainable markets and governance. In partnership with similar organizations throughout Africa, 
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Legal  Asia and Latin America IIED projects serve to strengthen capacity and governance mechanisms at 
the local, national and global levels. IIED has developed a Legal Tools program which also provides 
resources for host countries by developing, testing and implementing replicable capacity-building 
tools and methods to help local groups, national civil society and governments make use of 
available legal options. Though still in its infancy, Legal Tools has already provided legal literacy 
training in Ghana, Mali and Senegal - to inform and empower local communities and civil society, 
but which have been conducted further upstream to government officials. These trainings focus 
on land rights, decentralization, benefit-sharing opportunities and negotiation skills.  IIED also 
provides a host of free training manuals and legal tools that instruct governments on how to 
structure investment contracts for natural resource projects that maximize the investment’s 
contribution to sustainable development. 
The Legal Tools program has been delivered together with the following partners: 
• In Ghana, national and local-level trainings have been led by the Centre for Public Interest 
Law (CEPIL). 
• In Mali, activities have been led by Le Groupe d’Etude et de Recherche en Sociologie et Droit 
Appliqué (GERSDA), an action-research oriented center that brings together legal expertise, 
grounded legal empowerment experience, and partnerships with producer organizations. 
• In Mozambique, in-country work has been led by Centro Terra Viva (CTV), a public interest 
environmental law organization. CTV’s objectives are to promote participatory 
environmental governance rooted in science, justice and law. 
• In Senegal, activities were coordinated by IED Afrique: Innovations Environnement 
Développement. IED Afrique works to strengthen the capacity of vulnerable groups, 
documenting local practices and information policies.  
The Legal Tools program has received funding from the following bodies: Irish Aid (Ireland), 
Danida (Denmark), DFID (UK), DGIS (the Netherlands), Norad (Norway), SDC (Switzerland), and 
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Sida (Sweden). 
International Institute for Sustainable 
Development (IISD) 
Legal expertise 
IISD’s support ranges from in-depth research on investment law and investment dispute 
settlement to capacity building programs and forums meant to assist developing countries in 
forging sound investment contracts and treaties. Through its stable of international lawyers, IISD's 
Investment Program advises governments on negotiation and implementation of international 
investment treaties and contracts. IISD services and publications include the following: 
• Advice on drafting, negotiating and implementing international investment treaties and host 
government contracts, as well as investment disputes at the pre-claim stage; 
• Preparation of legal opinions on international investment law; 
• Training for negotiators and government officials at the country-specific and regional levels; 
• Easy-to-use “Best Practices Bulletins” to fill gaps in existing literature and better inform 
government officials; 
• Model Agreement on Investment, which provides insight into the creation of international 
investment agreements, paying special attention to the rights and obligations of both the 
investor and the host state. 
International Lawyers for Africa (ILFA) 
Legal expertise 
ILFA is a program run by international law firms based in the United Kingdom which aims to assist 
in the development of legal skills and expertise of African lawyers. ILFA provides, on a non-fee 
based basis, a 3 month program (running from September to November each year), which 
combines work experience through secondment to UK international law firms (20 firms are 
involved to date), with training sessions in international law and key legal practice skills.   The aim 
is to build the capacity of African lawyers in the areas of public international law, corporate law 
and international dispute resolution, to promote rule of law, create legal networks across African 
countries and to keep legal work in Africa.   
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Since its launch in 2006, 64 African lawyers have participated in the program, with lawyers from 
17 countries in Africa competing for places - Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Namibia, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe.  The program has been supported by Diageo, Associated British Foods 
PLC, H.J Heinz, Hewlett Packard and the Commercial Bar Association. 
Natural Resource Charter 
Capacity building 
The Natural Resource Charter provides a set of principles intended to aid policy makers in their 
use of natural resources in order to promote optimal returns for citizens from the resources.   
Oxford Policy Management(OPM) 
Policy, financial expertise 
OPM is an international development consultancy that enables strategic decision makers to 
identify and implement sustainable solutions for reducing social and economic disadvantage. For 
the extractive industries specifically, OPM conducts social and economic impact assessments and 
advises donors and host country governments on revenue management and transparency, local 
economic development, and development partnerships, among other related areas.  Specifically, 
the Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform (FOSTER), a five year program of support for 
oil and gas sector reforms in Nigeria, funded by DFID is implemented by OPM In partnership with 
Revenue Watch Institute and the Centre for the Study of Economies of Africa (CSEA). FOSTER is 
currently providing support in a number of areas in the development of a new, revised legislative 
framework that will govern the fiscal regime for future oil and gas production.  This includes 
providing technical and analytical support to help achieve consensus on a common approach by 
working with the Ministry of Finance, key legislative committees in the upper and lower 
legislatures, the main upstream and downstream regulatory agencies, the key petroleum unions, 
and relevant civil society organizations and media institutions. 
Pact  
Capacity building 
Pact has a natural resource management program through which it provides capacity building to 
governments in relation to natural resource management, mostly in relation to planning and 
frameworks. 
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Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
(PPIAF) 
Infrastructure development, capacity building, 
policy 
PPIAF is a multi-donor trust fund (financed by 17 multilateral and bilateral donors) that provides 
grants to governments in developing countries to allow them to obtain technical assistance 
directed to the development of policy frameworks that facilitate private investment in 
infrastructure, including with respect to policies, laws, regulations, institutions, and government 
capacity. It also supports governments to develop specific infrastructure projects with private 
sector participation.  
PPIAF has a work program structured around three strategic pillars (universal access, climate 
change, and urbanization) and four cross-cutting themes (sub-national technical assistance, fragile 
states, regional integration, and capacity building). 
Two-thirds of PPIAF’s support goes to low-income countries (that receive special consideration) 
and half of PPIAF support goes to Africa. Eligible sectors include water and sanitation, solid waste 
management, telecommunications, transport, energy, and irrigation. 
Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG) 
Infrastructure development 
PIDG works in partnership with other donors, local operators and government bodies to mobilize 
private sector investment, build infrastructure and increase funds for development. 
SNR Denton LLP and ACT Financial Consulting LLC 
Economic analysis 
SNR Denton LLP and ACT Financial Consulting LLP are collaborating to develop a cloud-based 
economic model for analyzing upstream petroleum project economics.  The model will be made 
available at no cost (a free user license) to emerging petroleum resource countries. The model will 
incorporate many educational features that can be readily incorporated in cloud-based platforms. 
Sustainable Development Strategies Group 
(SDSG) 
Capacity building, policy 
SDSG is a group of researchers and consultants, based in Colorado, US.  SDSG works with 
governments, companies, communities and others to develop solutions and build capacity for 
wise use and conservation of natural resources, for example, running capacity building workshops 
for governments and communities and review of countries’ mining legislation, SDSG was involved 
in the development of the Model Mine Development Agreement (with the IBA) and has more 
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recently released a library of Community Development Agreements.   
UNCTAD 
Investment advice 
Through its Division on Investment and Enterprise (DIAE), promotes understanding of, and helps 
build consensus on matters related to foreign direct investment (FDI), transfer of technology and 
development. DITE also helps developing countries attract and benefit from FDI and to build their 
productive capacities and international competitiveness. Its Special Programme for Least 
Developed, Landlocked and Island Developing Countries coordinates UNCTAD’s work in these 
categories of countries, providing analyses of the broad development challenges facing these 
countries and delivers technical assistance.  
Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable 
International Investment (VCC) 
Policy, capacity building, contract review 
A joint center of Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute at Columbia University, the VCC 
undertakes applied research to inform policy formulation, particularly with respect to legal and 
fiscal frameworks.  The VCC has also been involved in review of a country’s model production 
sharing contract and targeted capacity building workshops for government officials involved in 
countries’ minerals sector.   
World Bank Institute (WBI) – contracts database 
Legal 
Through its Governance Practice, the WBI is working with a number of partners to design and 
develop an online, searchable database of extractive industries contracts, starting with sub-
Saharan Africa. The project is collecting publicly available contracts and basic metadata on them 
in order to categorize the content of a subset of these contracts in a standardized way, provide an 
online interface for searching this collection, and serve as a central node to access and download 
complete texts of contracts. 
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Annex 3: Options for Structure and Governance, Financing Considerations 
A. Structure and Governance 
If a new initiative is to be created, whether as a coordinating mechanism, a complement to existing 
initiatives, a new comprehensive negotiation support facility or a mechanism through which to 
design and disseminate useful tools and resource to governments, there are a number of options to 
be considered with respect to its structure and governance.  These options will be explored in more 
detail at a subsequent workshop, if it is determined that a new mechanism is desirable and feasible.  
For the purpose of guiding an exploratory discussion at this workshop, a number of possible 
structure and governance options are described in the section below. Existing arrangements are 




Select Options for Institutional Setup and Governance 
 A.Multi-stakeholder initiative, 




Mechanism, e.g. ISLP  
D. Public Interest Firm E. Information sharing 
Forum, e.g. IGF  
Organization 
Form 
Non Profit Association International Organization 
Treaty body 
Non Profit Association Either General partnership or Limited 





Articles of Association Agreement on the Establishment of 
the Institution 
Articles of Association Partnership/ Limited Liability Company 
Agreement 




Personal Representatives appointed 
by constituency 
States and International institutions Members of the 
Association 
Partners or shareholders of public 
Interest firm 
Various – from States to firms 
and NGOs 
Liability Institution: Yes 
Members of Decision-Making Bodies: 
Limited Liability 
Institution: No 
Members of Decision-making bodies: 
No 
Generally liability of the 
members of a non-profit 
association 
General partnership: Shared liability of 
owners 
Limited liability company: No direct 
liability of shareholders 









If this were to be an incorporated 
entity, representatives of 
governments, industry and civil 
society could be invited into the 
membership of the association and 
vote on a weighted basis for the 
members of a Board that would take 





Board of Directors 
 
Depends on incorporating structure: 







Head of Secretariat Director (Chief Executive Officer) Executive Director Managing Partner or CEO  Head of Secretariat 
Key strength. A multi-stakeholder structure can 
foster collaboration. All relevant 
stakeholders play a role in 
determining the governance of the 
initiative and strategic priorities, 
Regional structure which has the 
potential to deliver a whole range of 
support (legal and technical) also on 
a global scale 
A lean organization which 
coordinates effectively. 
Able to draw upon highly 
experienced technical 
advisors as need arises. 
In-house professionals are able to 
deliver fast and high quality advisory 
services to governments 
A very light structure 
appropriate for information 
sharing 
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which confers buy-in and legitimacy.
9
 
Multi-stakeholder governance may 
create the necessary “space” for 
donors to allow its trust funds to be 
used in actual negotiation support. 
In contrast, limited stakeholder 
governance, which essentially 
includes only the government (with 
perhaps limited consultation of 
industry or civil society) has the 
advantage of easier and faster 
decision-making and more efficient 
working procedures.  
Simpler to establish. 
Key weakness Unless host countries consider they 
have sufficient influence in the multi-
stakeholder structure, it may lack 
acceptance.  Also, each stakeholder 
group may have to accommodate 
different views in its own 
constituency and reach agreement 
before it can take those views 
forward in discussion with others.
10
 
The disadvantages of limited 
stakeholder governance are that if 
the initiative becomes dominated by 
one player only, it has less legitimacy 
and buy-in from the other players, 
and may therefore be less 
transparent in its support overall. 
Being subject to treaty law the 
structure can be unwieldy (e.g., 
accession to a treaty of new 
members necessary). For example, 
the founding of ALSF took years, even 
with the support of the professional 
resources of the AfDB Legal 
department. 
A lower level of 
transparency as compared 
to the first two options may 
impede fund raising. There 
is little or no legal 
protection of directors. 
It may be more difficult for a public 
interest firm to deliver a whole range 
of support (including technical) across 
many countries 
An inter-governmental forum 
such as IGF cannot deliver 
entire range of required 
support. 
 
                                                            
9
 See http://www.eiti.org 
10
 See Mariëtte van Huijstee. (2012). Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives. A strategic guide for civil society organizations. Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations. The Netherlands 
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B. Financial aspects 
 
Any approach going forwards will require financing.  The nature and structure of the approach will 
influence the nature of the funding that is sought and available.  There are many funding options 
that can be considered, a number of which are described below.  Any mechanism or combination of 
mechanisms will require funding from one or a number of these (or additional) options, described 
below for the purpose of the exploratory discussions. Any real decision on financing to be sought will 
be discussed at a later workshop, depending on the outcome of the discussions at this workshop. 
Donor support The key issue is whether funds for negotiation support can be raised directly from 
donors, perhaps in the form of a revolving fund.  
Cost recovery Cost recovery from host countries after successful negotiations (at least part of the 
total cost) would be very desirable, not only for the financial sustainability of the initiative but also 
to ensure quality of service and appreciation of value by recipients. In this regard, the experience of 
the ALSF will be interesting.  
Cost recovery from investors There are a number of models that may be used which require the 
investor to cover the government’s costs in retaining experts. Recovering costs from investors 
requires careful consideration of an institutional model to ensure transparency in the selection and 
terms of retention of advisers.  One option is for the costs paid for by the investor to be considered 
as a part of the recoverable costs of the investor in determining the “split” of contract economics 
between the investor and the state.  Another model could require (as a contractual term and a 
precondition to the government entering into negotiations) that the investor agrees to an annual 
payment from project revenues towards the cost of the government retaining advisers. In terms of 
institutional models to deal with the receipt of investor funding for payment of advisers, one 
example may be a “clearing house” organization to administer the process, ensuring transparent 
selection of advisors and to serve as the “pay master” for disbursements to such advisors to ensure 
they remain effectively insulated from investor pressure which could give rise to conflicts of interest. 
Another example could be a facility that covers the costs of retaining lawyers and other professional 
advisors to represent the government, administering the selection of advisors with the host 
government, and receives an annual payment from the investor’s project revenues to the facility. 
The facility would recover costs but would not be tied to costs – the annual payment would 
ultimately contribute to resources (in effect by way of endowment).  Both of these options would 
initially require donor assistance for their establishment and initial engagements but the funding 
option would aim over time to eliminate the need for donor support 
Direct fund raising A further option might be to help governments to raise funds themselves. 
Offering a plausible system of selecting, instructing and supervising experts for funding by bilateral 
or multilateral funding agencies might be a practical way to proceed in this regard. In the case of 
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